The patchwork watermarking scheme is investigated in this chapter. The performance of this algorithm in terms of imperceptibility, robustness and security has been shown to be satisfactory. Robustness of the patchwork algorithm to the curve-fitting attack and blind multipleembedding attack is presented also in this chapter. Robustness against jitter attack which is a natural enemy of this watermarking algorithm is also studied.
INTRODUCTION
Watermarking algorithm must satisfy at least two constraints: imperceptibility and robustness.
Embedded audio watermarks should be almost inaudible. Data can be embedded with psychoacoustic analysis that will make the watermarked signal far much less audible. Also, the algorithm should be robust enough to withstand attempts such as removal or alteration of inserted watermarks. Intriguing attacks threat watermarking techniques. The algorithms we analyze in this chapter are robust against many attacks such as lossy compression, noise addition, filtering, quantization, and so on. Needless to say, these two constraints, imperceptibility and robustness, seem to be contradictive. However, both constraints must be satisfied.
Other requirements include blind detection, capability and high embedding capacity. The patchwork algorithm is blind: non-watermarked signal is not necessary for detecting hidden message. Embedding capacity of the patchwork is relatively high since each subset consists of a small number of populations.
Original patchwork algorithm is refreshingly novel among many watermarking methods. The algorithm has been proposed as an image watermarking scheme at the outset. This algorithm has inserted information into the time-domain signal. Moreover, the population of each subset was very large: It was not adaptive to the signal: it added or subtracted constant d independently of the signal strength. Nonetheless, it has provided a solid base as an excellent tool for information hiding. Recently, Arnold (2000) has tried to improve the performance of the original patchwork algorithm. Arnold's algorithm (Arnold, 2000 ) is a landmark in the area of watermarking research, especially for patchwork algorithm. Yeo and Kim (2003a) have focused on the improvement of the previous patchwork algorithms. They have derived mathematical formulations that help to improve robustness. The core idea of the improved scheme is called the modified patchwork algorithm (MPA) (Yeo, 2003a} which can enhance the power of the original patchwork algorithm considerably.
The MPA is an additive watermarking scheme such as
where s(n) is an non-watermarked audio sample at time instance n, d(n) is an watermark signal, and x(n) is an watermarked sample. Yeo and Kim (Yeo, 2003b) have generalized the patchwork algorithm by introducing multiplicative watermarking scheme such as
However, note that the multiplicative watermarking scheme is not so effective in case of image watermarking. Thus, they have combined the additive and multiplicative schemes with suitable parameters such as
where k 1 + k 2 = 1. The algorithm in Equation (3) is called the generalized patchwork algorithm (GPA) (Yeo, 2003b) . Unfortunately, the best performance was achieved when k 2 = 0 in case of image watermarking. In other words, it implies the additive scheme only is the best in case of image watermarking.
Performance of the MPA has been thoroughly studied by Yeo and Kim (2003a) , Cvejic and Seppänen (2003) , and Cvejic and Tujkovic (2004) . It has been concluded that the MPA is sufficiently robust. Recently, Das et al. (2005) have performed cryptanalysis against the GPA for image watermarking based on the curve-fitting attack (Das, 2004) . The experimental results are based on the assumption: "the GPA is public, and the attackers have the information of how to divide watermarked images". It is impractical in real world since an image owner can divide the image into blocks of random size in such a manner that it is difficult to access the information of image block size for an attacker. That is to say, the cryptanalytic method (Das, 2004; Das, 2005} is ineffective to the watermarking scheme once the size of image block for watermarking is saved as a secret key. At the same time, we note that this cryptanalysis against MPA audio watermarking (Yeo, 2003a} has not been performed yet.
Thus, in this chapter we will survey the patchwork algorithms and their robustness as the audio and image watermarking schemes. In the next section, security of GPA image watermark-ing is investigated. Robustness of the MPA as an audio watermarking against the curvefitting attack and blind multiple-embedding attack will be presented next. Their robustness against jitter attack will also be studied. Finally, the conclusion is drawn and future works will be considered. 
SECURITY EVALUATION OF GENERALIZED PATCHWORK ALGORITHM
Here we survey a cryptanalytic method of the generalized patchwork algorithm under the assumption that the attacker possesses only a single copy of the watermarked image (Das, 2005) . In the scheme, the watermark is inserted by modifying randomly chosen DCT values in each block of the original image, referred to (Yeo, 2003b) . Towards the attack the authors fit the low degree polynomials (which minimize the mean square error) on the data available from each block of the watermarked content. Then, corresponding DCT data of the attacked image is replaced by the available data from the polynomials to construct an attacked image.
The technique nullifies the modification achieved during watermark embedding. Experimental results show that recovery of the watermark becomes difficult after the attack under the assumption that the size of image blocks is leaked.
Take an image of size M×M. Consider the image in DCT domain, where the Discrete Cosine Transform has been done using block size N×N. There is a secret key K 1 and a secret water-
bits binary pattern.
Bit Embedding
Consider the case each DCT block where a bit is inserted. The key K 1 is used as a seed of pseudo random number generator to get random index values from [Z 1 ,
, where the index values are matched with orders of the JPEG-like zigzag pattern in the DCT block. Now two index sets I 0 and I 1 , each containing 2n elements, are generated using the secret key K 1 as follows: Thus, in total 4n DCT coefficients are chosen for inserting the watermark and out of them 2n coefficients are modified.
Bit Extraction
For decoding and detecting the watermark, the following strategy is used. Note that here the a uthors work on the watermarked image and the scheme is oblivious, so the original image is n ot required. Only the secret key K 1 need to be known to generate the index sets. Take The basic idea behind the bit extraction is as follows. Since the DCT coefficients are approximated by a polynomial on the watermarked image, the effect of modifying the original DCT data will be approximated and nullified depending on the degree of the approximating polynomial.
It is clear that as increasing the degree d of the polynomial, the mean square error is less and the quality of the image will stay good, but the effect of nullification of the watermark will be less. On the other hand, if the degree is decreased, the mean square error will be more and the extracted image will not have good image quality, but the removal of watermark information will be achieved in a much better way. Thus, it need to make a compromise over this based on the DCT data.
The reason why the authors do not sort the DCT data before fitting the DCT polynomial is as follows. If the data get sorted then it becomes monotonically increasing or decreasing (according to the sorting). Hence the data can be very well modeled with low degree polynomial with very small mean square error. Thus, when one gets back to the DCT coefficients from the polynomial, the modified data (and also the data that are not modified) are not disturbed much and consequently the watermark is not removed.
Experimental Results
The authors consider the parameters used by Yeo et The attacker buys a single copy and then modifies it in such a manner such that the buyerspecific watermark cannot be extracted from the attacked images. Thus, the main motivation of the attacker is removing the watermark completely. Towards that direction we in the chapter made extensive experiments. It is found that in the event the information of block size divided in the embedding is accessed by the attacker, that is the same size of image block is deployed for such a attack, we can use polynomials of degree 3, 4 or 5 by which the watermark is removed completely and the attacked image quality also stays good (> 30 dB PSNR with respect to the attacked image). However, the watermark can be extracted at a low bit error rate if we use the different size of image block as that in the embedding. It means that in the watermarking embedding, the size of blocks can be saved as key for improvement of security against fitting-curve attacks.
The authors (Das, 2005) present the experimental results listed in Table 1 , for three different 512 512 × images. The result is agreeing with our testing well under the assumption that the attacker has accessed the information of image block size. The attack process is presented as follows. We insert a 64 bit watermark considering two cases:
(i). , when x bits are matching. That is, if x = 32, then the correlation is 0. In our experimentation, the maximum absolute value of correlation after the attack is 0.125, when x = 36 or 28. This clearly indicates that the cryptanalysis presented here is successful if the size of blocks is leaked.
In the testing, we provide the PSNR of the attacked image with respect to the watermarked image to present the image quality too. One can check that we get PSNR (of the attacked image with respect to the watermarked image) values greater than 30 dB. We present the "number of bits matching, the PSNR value in dB" in each cell corresponding to the degree of the polynomials which we take as 3, 4, and 5. Table 1 .
MODIFIED PATCHWORK ALGORITHM AND ITS ROBUSTNESS
Basically, the elements of two sets should be taken randomly to make sure good performance. If a set A is sampled, for example, from one rectangle just below the chin of a Korean actress, and another sample B from another rectangle as shown in Figure1, it is difficult to ensure
. Note that, here are two ways to achieve mathematically
The first approach is to make two sets A and B large in number of elements. However, due to the high cross-correlation between neighboring samples, especially in image, making larger sets usually contributes less to goodness of the sets. In other words, this approach seldom succeeds. The second approach is to set elements randomly. Random samples (see the right figure) marked by small circles and rectangle nearly ensures 0 = − b a even though the number of samples are small. That is why randomness is important in statistical image processing, especially in the patchwork algorithm.
As mentioned before, the patchwork scheme is one of the most viable solutions for digital audio and image watermarking. Basically the patchwork schemes choose 4 pairs of sample subsets randomly, and then modify the sample values of each subset in different manners. For example, a constant d is added to all sample values of one subset conceptually while d is subtracted from other subset values as long as the patchwork scheme is additive. In other words, it makes the large samples larger and the small samples smaller. Then accordingly, sample means of each subset are changed or location of mean is shifted according to the value d and its sign. Thus, the "location-shift" scheme stresses the fact of shifting sample means due to additive scheme (see Figure 2) . Most of the previous patchwork schemes Pitas, 1995; Wang, 2004; Yeo, 2003a ) are additive. Additive patchwork scheme detects watermark by computing difference between mean values of two subsets and applying hypothesis test. Theoretically, the difference will be 2d for the watermarked signal and 0 for non-watermarked signal. On the other hand, multiplicative patchwork scheme changes the sample variances by multiplying (1 + d) or (1 -d) by sample values. Accordingly, sample variance value of one subset increases while another subset decreases. In other words, multiplicative scheme scales the variance values up or down. Similarly, the "scale-shift" scheme stresses the fact of scaling sample variances due to multiplicative scheme (Yeo, 2003b) . The ratio of resulting variances between two subsets is a clue to detect bit information embedded.
The additive and multiplicative patchwork schemes can be combined appropriately in order to increase robustness and reduce perceptibility. The patchwork scheme can be applied to both audio and image. It can be applied in the DCT domain or in the DWT domain or in whatever domain. Transformation is more useful than embedding in the time-domain in terms of psychoacoustic analysis and high probability to have almost equal sample means for both subsets Shift of mean due to additive data hiding
Multiplicative Additive Shift of variance due to multiplicative data hiding
This property is important to reduce false alarm rate at the detection process. Since the patchwork scheme modifies relatively small number of samples, it is desirable in terns of imperceptibility. Note that , and Pitas and Kaskalis (1995) have modified samples across the whole image by dividing it into two subsets. Yeo and Kim have shown that around 30 samples are sufficient to hide one bit of data as long as the samples are randomly chosen.
Modified Patchwork Algorithm
In the embedding step two subsets A and B are necessary. Each subset has n elements such as A = {a 1 , …, a n } and B = {b 1 2005) have performed cryptanalysis against the GPA for image watermarking based on the curve-fitting attack (Das, 2004) under the assumption that an attacker can get the information of how to segment image blocks. Note that this cryptanalysis against audio watermarking has not been performed yet. In this section, the curve-fitting attack is applied to the audio samples for the cryptanalysis. In addition, the blind multiple-embedding attack is applied under the assumption that the embedding position is unknown while the modified patchwork algorithm is known to public.
The curve-fitting attack has two forms. The original attack (Das, 2004) transforms the time-domain samples, sorts the transformed coefficients, and fits the curve by the sorted coefficients to modify the data as slightly as possible. The rationale is simple. If the data gets sorted, it becomes monotonically increasing or decreasing (according to the sorting). Conse-quently, low degree polynomials are enough to modeling the sorted data with small mean square error. Then, the attack can not disturb the image much but remove watermarks considerably as a consequence. The first method (Das, 2004) was verified effective to some watermarking techniques, but almost ineffective to the patchwork algorithm. The second approach (Das, 2005) transforms the time-domain samples, and applies curve-fitting to the unsorted transformed coefficients. It is noted that the DCT data remains unsorted to disturb more for the image patchwork algorithm as long as the information of image block size is leaked. Figure 4 shows an example of unsorted samples and sorted samples by magnitudes of the DCT coefficient. The fitted coefficients are replaced with the values corresponding to the fitted polynomial. In case of audio watermarking, such an attack is not so effective since the information of how to segment audio clips may be kept as a secret key. Extensive testing shows that under the condition that the length of segments is secret, it can not remove hidden message while its audio quality degrades very much. In the event that an attacker has got the information of how to segment the clips, the watermark by patchwork algorithm (Yeo, 2003b) will be destroyed. In real world, it is impractical to get the information of how to segment audio since the length of audio segments can be selected randomly in a huge space.
In our experiments, the audio clips (for experiments, we choose a "Japanese Pop music" as example clip) are basically chopped by multiples of 4,410 samples for the audio sampled at the rate of 44,100 samples per second. For each segment of samples, the DCT is first per-formed. The index range in each segment is chosen randomly in [Z L =500, Z U =1000] as a key K 1 . The value of n has been taken to be 25. The watermark is a binary sequence of 30 bits.
The SNR (Signal-to-Noise Rate) of the watermarked audio is around 46.56 dB. Each bit of watermark is embedded 5 times for correction of error. About the details of embedding process and used parameters, we refer to the previous work (Yeo, 2003b ). Our motivation is to investigate whether the method (Das, 2005 ) is acting on the patchwork audio watermarking algorithm. Towards this direction we made extensive tests mainly including Test I: suppose that the attacker has known all parameters except the key K 1 , and Test II: the attacker has the information of watermarking embedding scheme but the length of segments 4,410 (as the key K 2 ) and the key K 1 are unknown. We have optimized the polynomials with the degree 3, 4
and 5 by the curve-fitting tool in the MATLAB. The polynomial type is described as follows:
The attack test results are tabulated in Table 2 . Corresponding to is not known by an attacker, the watermark is successfully extracted at a low error bit even the audio quality has been degraded a lot. As a conclusion, the fitting-curve attacks degrade the audio quality a lot, and the audio watermarking based on patchwork algorithm is secure to polynomial fitting attacks as long as the information of segmenting audio for watermarking is not leaked.
Blind multiple-embedding attack is an attack that embeds data N times into the audio clip already watermarked with the MPA. Since the position of n samples is not known to attackers, what they can do is to embed data using the same watermarking algorithm N times in the hope of destroying watermarks. However, the probability of hitting m positions (or, equivalently, samples) exactly among n positions from the M populations is very low. Thus, multiple embedding by N times will increase the chance of destroying more number of watermarked samples. Experiments show this blind attack is to be shown ineffective. In the experiments, 30 bits of message were hidden. The detail embedding method can be found in the literature by Yeo and Kim (2003a) . The test results are listed in Table 3 . As the number of blind embedding increases, the number of undetected bits also increases as a sequence. Of course, audio quality degrades quickly as N increases. In case of Japanese Pop Music, all 30 bits are detected successfully at low error rate even after 100 times of multiple embedding. Regarding other different types of music, the simulation results are similar.
Of course, the patchwork algorithm has a natural enemy: the jitter attack. Such an attack deleting sample randomly will cause the position of watermarked samples shifted (Xiang, 2006) . This position alteration incurs serious detection error. Figure 5 illustrates the situation vividly. Position of the watermarked samples is marked by 'o' in the Figure. Due to the intentional deletion of the 4 th sample, detector locates the wrong positions since it does not know whether the samples have been attacked or not. As a conclusion, the jitter attack is a very effective attack to the patchwork algorithm because the MPA hides data into number of audio segments. If the position of samples is changed by jitter attack, it will cause the desynchronization of the watermark. As a result, the watermark will be difficult to be recovered. The test results of jitter attacks with different strength are tabulated in Table 4 . Here 1/700 means that one sample is deleted out of each 700 samples. Unfortunately, this blind attack is to be shown ineffective. In the experiments, 50 bits of message were hidden. The detail embedding method can be found in the literature by Yeo and Kim (Yeo, 2003a) . As the number of blind embeddings increases, the number of undetected messages also increases accordingly. Performance depends on the target music. In case of Japanese Pop Music, all 50 bits are detected successfully even after 30 times of multiple embedding. However, audio quality degrades quickly as N increases.
CONCLUSIONS
The patchwork algorithms, the generalized patchwork algorithm (GPA) and the modified patchwork algorithm (MPA), are investigated briefly as the image and audio watermarking schemes in this chapter. The performance of this algorithm in terms of imperceptibility and robustness has been shown to be satisfactory by many researchers (Yeo, 2003a; Cvejic, 2003; Cvejic, 2004) . Recently, Das et al. (2005) have performed cryptanalysis against the GPA for image watermarking based on the curve-fitting attack (Das, 2004) under the assumption that the information of how to divide the image is known. Note that this cryptanalysis against au-
Sample Watermarked Samples
Unwatermarked Samples Jitter Attacked Position Figure 5 . The effect of jitter attack. By deleting one samples intentionally, the position of watermarked samples (above) are changed so that the detector tries to at the position marked by □ (below), which incurs serious detection error. dio watermarking has not been performed yet. Thus, robustness of the patchwork algorithm against the curve-fitting attack as a cryptanalysis for audio and blind multiple embedding attack is presented, respectively. Our experimental testing shows that GPA image watermarking and MPA audio watermarking have a satisfactory security against the cryptanalytic methods (Das, 2004; Das, 2005) since the information of how to divide the image or segment the audio that may be considered as a secret key in such a way that it is difficult to be broken by the attacker. As a result, the security of patchwork schemes is reliable against the fitting-curve attacks. In addition, robustness against jitter attack is also studied. As a conclusion, the patchwork algorithm is sufficiently robust and imperceptible. And, it is also security against curvefitting attack by saving the size of image block or the length of audio segment for watermarking as a secret key. However, there are some open issues to be discussed in patchwork schemes. One of them is how to fight the desynchronization attacks presented by Xiang et al. (2006) , such as jitter attack discussed in this chapter. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

